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Abstract 
 
We find evidence that monetary policy influenced bank lending in Turkey in the period 1991 – 
2007 both directly through the money lending channel and indirectly through the bank lending 
channel. The bank lending channel is shown to depend on two bank characteristics, namely 
liquidity and capital. We also find that both capital and GDP growth have plausible positive and 
significant long-run effects on bank loan growth, whereas inflation, bank size and, in particular, 
efficiency do not have a significant equilibrium relationship with loan growth. This latter result 
is despite our finding that the efficiency of all Turkish banks improved over the period. It is also 
evident that domestic banks are, unexpectedly, found to be more efficient, on average, than 
foreign banks. We discovered no evidence of significant dynamics or fixed-effects in the growth 
of loans and so prefer to use the pooled OLS estimator over the fixed-effects and Arellano and 
Bond estimators. We therefore caution against assuming the existence of fixed-effects and 
dynamics in such models as this may adversely affect inference.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The stability and efficiency of the Turkish banking system was considerably undermined 
by two severe financial crises in the early 1990s and in the period 1999-2001. Since the banking 
sector is the backbone of the Turkish economy, the Government realised that a sound and 
efficient banking sector requires an adequate macro- and micro-economic environment in which 
to operate, that will be consistent with, and help promote, the widening financial activities of 
commercial banks.  
Several research studies have recently been published on the performance and 
efficiency of the Turkish banking system, see, for example, Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas (2008), 
Aysan and Ceyhan (2008), Demir et al. (2007), Demir et al. (2005), among others. The present 
paper contributes to this ongoing research by providing a detailed overview of the development of 
the Turkish banking system in last twenty years. In particular, we analyse bank performance over 
the period 1991-2007. Our unique dataset enables us to identify actual or potential problems in 
the Turkish banking system and individual banks. Such information is valuable in the process of 
further banking consolidation and restructuring. In addition, it contributes to the current 
discussion about the competitiveness and efficiency of the Turkish banking sector in the context 
of the EU enlargement process. If there is significant inefficiency among banks there may be 
room for structural changes, increased competition, mergers and acquisitions. 
The paper contributes to policy makers and bank management by analysing the impact 
of the liberalisation and restructuring process of the banking sector in Turkey. Further, it 
provides policy recommendations for Turkey where significant challenges in banking 
consolidation remain.  
Throughout the study we show the following: Firstly, we find that monetary policy has a 
direct impact upon bank loans in Turkey through the money lending channel. Secondly, we 
provide evidence that the bank lending channel (BLC) depends on bank characteristics (liquidity 
and capital in the case of Turkey) as has been shown by recent empirical studies for transition 
economies, e.g. Matousek and Sarantis (2009). Thirdly, banks’ liberalisation and restructuring 
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processes in the early 1990s and 2001 had the expected effect on the Turkish banking system in 
terms of improved performance (increased efficiency). Our results contrast with the findings 
published by Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas (2008), Demir et al. (2007), among others. Fourthly, we 
assess the hypothesis that foreign banks should be more efficient than domestic banks (Isik and 
Hassan (2002), Mercan and Yolalan, (2000)). This hypothesis is in line with the results from 
transition economies see, for example, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006). Our findings are not 
consistent with this hypothesis, indicating that domestic banks are, on average, more efficient 
than foreign banks. Fifthly, we show that bank efficiency is not an important determinant in the 
BLC or of the growth of bank loans more generally in Turkey. Finally, we find that while there 
are dynamics in the levels of the data they are not evident in their first differences and so we 
do not favour inference from the Arellano and Bond (1991) panel estimator. We further find an 
absence of significant fixed-effects which suggests that our first difference specification likely 
removes any fixed-effects that are present in the levels of the data. Hence, we favour inference 
from the pooled OLS estimator. We note that previous research on the BLC using panel data 
that assumes the presence of dynamics and fixed-effects in the first differenced data may not, 
therefore, be using the most appropriate estimators for inference. We suggest that future 
research in this area gives full consideration to the most appropriate estimator to be used in 
any particular application. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information about the Turkish 
banking system. Section 3 reviews current studies on the BLC and bank efficiency. The fourth 
section outlines the estimation methodology and measuring cost efficiency in the banking 
industry. Section 5 discusses the results while Section 6 concludes and provides policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. Banking Sector and Macroeconomic Settings 
Turkey entered 1980 with a major stabilisation and liberalisation programme after a period of 
prolonged economic crisis during the late 1970s. Besides its immediate objective of restoring 
macroeconomic stability, the programme’s long-term goal was to fundamentally transform the 
Turkish economy into a market-based open economy. 
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The Turkish economy was characterised by high and chronic inflation and volatile real 
output growth performance due to the economy relying on short-term financial flows as a 
major source of external financing. The Central Bank was under Government control and 
monetary policy was subordinate to fiscal policy in an environment with a high public sector 
borrowing requirement. 
A crawling-peg type exchange rate regime was introduced to act as a nominal anchor 
and monetary expansion was strictly linked to foreign currency inflows. With the liberalisation 
of capital account transactions and the removal of restrictions on holding foreign currency, 
foreign markets have become an important resource for banks to raise funds along with deposit 
collection. Increasing currency substitution in the economy was driven by high inflation 
expectations. Delays in reform activities, adverse developments in international financial 
markets and financing needs of the public sector as well as the widening current account deficit 
led to a general loss of credibility for the disinflation program towards the end of 2000. 
Substantial capital outflows and sharp increases in domestic borrowing rates magnified the 
financing difficulties faced by state banks as well as some private banks. A systemic crisis was 
already underway and reached its peak in November 2000 causing significant erosions in bank 
capital. The authorities’ attempts to calm the markets failed. Escalating political tensions and 
loss of credibility in the exchange rate regime triggered another crisis in February 2001 upon 
which the authorities had to abolish the crawling-peg regime and leave the Turkish Lira to float 
freely. The crisis proved to be one of the most severe and financial markets almost came to a 
standstill as the Lira depreciated sharply. Overnight interest rates reached four digit figures and 
the Istanbul stock exchange collapsed. A number of banks had already become practically 
insolvent while some others were on the brink of it. Spreading into the real sector, the crisis led 
to a record contraction in economic activities. 
The Turkish banking sector proved to be the main beneficiary of the financial liberalisation 
process given its traditional dominance in the system. Tables 1 and 2 provide various basic 
indicators on the Turkish banking industry over the period 1980-2007. The launched reforms 
led to a large number of new bank entries, both domestic and foreign, which in turn increased 
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competition in the banking sector and enhanced banking activities in terms of resources and 
placements. Total bank assets tripled, loans almost tripled, while deposits saw a near four-fold 
increase by the end of 1990. An increase in the number of branches and employees reflects the 
rapid growth of the banking sector under the post-1980s policy environment. Banks also 
started to establish subsidiaries and branches abroad. 
Another important result of the reform process was the banks achievement of rapid 
technological transformation and well-qualified human resources to the extent that, by the late 
1990s, Turkish banks became some of the most sophisticated in the region, see Denizer (2000). 
This enabled banks to increase their service and product scale (as well as quality) and engage in 
new areas of financial products. The number of small and medium size banks involved in 
wholesale banking with a few branches increased while market shares of larger private banks 
declined under free interest rate and flexible foreign exchange rate policies. Wholesale banks 
mainly concentrated on foreign trade financing, leasing, factoring, forfeiting, short-term 
lending, and fund raising from international financial markets (BAT, 2008). 
However, these positive structural developments in the Turkish banking system were 
overshadowed by some rather disturbing issues. Initial stabilisation efforts of the early 1980s 
were short-lived and were followed by a rather populist attitude. Public deficits increased and 
inflation rates soared towards the late 1980s. Substantial deposit withdrawals and serious 
liquidity problems forced the government to intervene and liquidate three insolvent small 
banks, announce a full deposit insurance scheme and provide liquidity support to the affected 
banks.  
In the second half of the 1990s the government was forced to radically consolidate and 
reshape the banking sector. As a result of these changes, the banking sector not only rapidly 
recovered from the crisis but also jumped to the highest expansion path in its history in terms 
of number of banks, branches, and employees in the second half of the 1990s. Record levels 
were attained in 1999 regarding the number of banks and employment in the sector, while the 
number of branches reached its peak in 2000. The surge was also reflected in asset and deposit 
volumes both of which more than doubled from 1995 to 2000. Declining market concentration 
in terms of assets, which likely points to a reduction in market power and increase in 
7 
 
competition, and private banks overtaking state banks in terms of asset share were among the 
other notable developments of this period. The authorities introduced an ambitious three-year 
(2000-2002) disinflation program at the end of 1999 which envisaged various structural reforms 
and the adoption of tight fiscal and monetary policies. As part of the program’s financial reform 
measures, a new banking law was enacted and a new independent regulatory body, namely the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), was established.  
Delays in the programmed reform activities, adverse developments in international 
financial markets and heavy financing needs of the public sector as well as the widening current 
account deficit led to a general loss of credibility for the disinflation program towards the end 
of 2000. Substantial capital outflows and sharp increases in domestic borrowing rates magnified 
the financing difficulties faced by state banks as well as some private banks. A systemic crisis 
was already underway and reached its peak in November 2000 causing significant erosions in 
bank capital. In May 2001, the government announced a comprehensive program with support 
from the IMF. Overall, the program’s measures targeted the economy’s resilience to external 
shocks, bringing down inflation, reducing the public sector’s debts, ensuring financial discipline, 
completion of financial reforms, and the reinforcement of the banking system. The latter, 
known as the Banking Sector Restructuring Program, proved to be the vital part of the overall 
program. It was designed to include a wide range of measures (with further additions as 
needed going forward) in each of the following main priority areas: i) financial and operational 
restructuring of state-owned commercial banks, ii) prompt resolution of banks that were taken 
over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, iii) strengthening of the financial position of private 
banks and, iv) improvement of the regulatory and supervisory framework in line with 
international (and EU) standards. The ultimate objective was to eliminate distortions in financial 
markets and promote an efficient, globally competitive and sound banking sector. 
The banking law was renewed in 2005 and required new regulations with procedures 
subsequently introduced. In effect, the regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking 
sector is being almost fully compliant with the related EU legislation and the internationally 
recognized principles, standards and applications. At the same time, institutional infrastructure 
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and human resources of the BRSA have been strengthened further along with its autonomous 
regulatory and supervisory powers. 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1 Lending Channel 
 
In the economic literature and among practitioners, there has been a renewed interest 
in analysing the role of banks in the monetary transmission mechanism and, in particular, the 
bank lending channel (BLC). According to the bank lending channel, changes in monetary policy 
shift banks’ loan supply schedules. The BLC is due to a combination of a binding lending 
constraint and a deposit market constraint. When the central bank squeezes liquidity from the 
system, banks are forced to shift from reservable or insured funds to nonreservable or 
uninsured sources of funds. The bank lending view rests on the idea that banks with weak 
balance sheets find it difficult to raise uninsured funds due to prohibitive agency costs in the 
deposit market (Kishan and Opiela, 2006). Stein (1998) argues that uninsured funds are also 
potentially subject to adverse selection problems and credit rationing. Consequently, these 
banks lose funds for loans and are thus forced to reduce lending to their bank-dependent 
clients.  
The implication of the BLC is that the response of bank loans to shifts in monetary policy 
differs depending upon a bank’s characteristics or strengths of their balance sheets. In general, 
the lending behaviour of banks with weak balance sheets should be more sensitive to monetary 
shocks than that of banks with strong balance sheets. The existing literature has emphasised 
three major bank characteristics, or measures of balance sheet strength, that could affect the 
response of bank loans to a shift in monetary policy. First, asset size (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 
and 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000); second, bank capitalisation (Peek and Rosengren 1995; 
Kishan and Opiela, 2000 and 2006); third, liquidity (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).   
Seminal papers on the existence of the bank lending channel, using disaggregated data 
on banking firms, were produced for the US. Kashyap and Stein (1995) found that the growth of 
bank loans for the sub-segment of small commercial banks was the most responsive to 
9 
 
monetary policy. A further study by Kashyap and Stein (2000) divided banks not only by asset 
size but also by liquidity. They showed that the smallest most illiquid banks were most 
responsive to monetary policy. Kashian and Opiela (2000) support the previous research by 
dividing banks both by size and capital strength. Kashian and Opiela (2006) investigate the 
asymmetric effects of monetary policy on the loan behaviour of low-capital and high-capital 
banks and their results are consistent with the lending channel predictions, but only for the 
post-Basel period. In general, studies for US banks provide supportive evidence for the BLC in 
the transmission of monetary policy, though this has recently been questioned by Ashcraft 
(2006). When using bank data, Ashcraft identifies a differential response of loan supply to 
changes in the federal funds rate across banks as well. However, when he aggregates the bank 
data up to the state level, the loan market share of affiliated banks tends to mitigate the 
negative response of state loan growth to changes in monetary policy, while the aggregate 
elasticity of output to bank lending is insignificant and negative. 
Empirical studies from Europe are less conclusive. Favero et al (1999) investigated the 
presence of a BLC in Germany, France, Italy and Spain during the monetary restriction in 1992. 
They did not find any evidence for the BLC in these countries. The study presented by de Bondt 
(1999) analyses six European countries. The analysis shows that a bank lending channel is 
present in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands when the short term interest rate is used as 
proxy for monetary policy stance. No supportive evidence is found for France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. In the second part of his study, where the short-term interest rate is replaced 
by a monetary condition index, the BLC is present in France and Italy. Ehrmann et al (2003) 
investigate the BLC using micro and aggregate data for Germany, France, Italy and Spain. They 
find that less liquid banks react more strongly to shifts in monetary policy than more liquid 
banks, but bank size and capitalisation are generally not important. Kakes and Sturm (2002) find 
that lending in small German banks declines more than in large banks after a monetary 
contraction. Gambacorta (2005) finds similar evidence for Italian banks with regards to 
capitalisation and liquidity. Altunbas et al (2002) also assesses the existence of a BLC in 
European countries. They find that across the EMU system, undercapitalised banks tend to 
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respond more to changes in monetary policy, irrespective of their size. We are unaware of any 
study that analyses monetary transmission mechanism through the BLC in Turkey. 
 
3.2 Bank Efficiency 
There has been extensive research on bank efficiency in Turkey. Recent studies include 
Isik and Hassan (2002) who estimated bank efficiency in Turkey over the period 1988-1996. 
They compare nonparametric and parametric approaches. Their results showed that the main 
source of inefficiency in the Turkish banking was due to technical inefficiency rather than 
allocative inefficiency caused by diseconomies of scale. They supported the view that foreign 
banks operating in Turkey are significantly more efficient than their domestic peers. Kasman 
(2002) used a three input—three output Fourier-flexible cost function specification to 
investigate cost efficiency, scale economies, and technological progress in the Turkish banking 
system over the period 1988-1998. Empirical results disclosed that the Turkish banking system 
had significant inefficiency problems in the analysed period. The average annual inefficiency 
levels decreased over the sample period. Kasman argued that commercial banks in the sector 
operated more inefficiently than their U.S. and European counterparts. They confirmed the 
existence of scale economies across the sample and no evidence of diseconomies of scale for 
larger banks was identified.  
Denizer et al. (2007) examined bank efficiency before and after the liberalisation 
process in Turkey by applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They concluded that 
liberalisation programmes were followed by a decline in bank efficiency. The second part of 
their research indicated that the decline in efficiency was closely related with macroeconomic 
instability. A recent study by Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas (2008) computes the technical efficiency 
of non-public commercial banks between 1990 and 2001 by using the DEA model. They find a 
gradual decline in bank efficiency over the period. 
In the following part, we provide a brief summary of papers that have been published 
on transition economies and could be of interest for comparision purposes. Bonin et al. (2005) 
and Fries and Taci (2005) analysed the effects of bank ownership on bank efficiency and 
concluded that foreign banks are more cost-efficient than domestic banks. Another study by 
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Kasman and Yildirim (2006) analysed the cost and profit efficiencies in commercial banking in 
the eight Central and Eastern European countries that became members of the EU. They found 
significant levels of cost and profit inefficiency. They argued that there have been no strong and 
consistent efficiency gains in the new member countries’ banking sectors in recent years. This 
contrasts with some previous studies on transition countries which show that banking sectors 
became more efficient in the late 1990s. Their results also indicated that foreign banks perform, 
on average, better than domestic banks.   
Recent studies on this topic include Staikouras et al. (2008) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki 
et al. (2009). The former examined cost efficiency in the banking sector of six South Eastern 
European countries, while the latter used a directional technology distance function to estimate 
the efficiency and productivity change in CEECs. Both papers, i.e. Staikouras et al. (2008) and 
Filippaki et al. (2009), confirmed that foreign banks and banks with foreign participation exhibit 
higher efficiency scores.  
In our model we control for the impact of efficiency and, treating it like a fourth bank 
characteristic, consider whether the BLC operates through differences in the degree of 
efficiency of banks. The inclusion of bank efficiency scores into a model is an innovation of our 
paper. 
 
4. Data and Model Specification 
 
In our analysis, we use annual data over the period 1991-2007. The sample includes 25 
commercial banks operating in Turkey, which are listed in Table 3. The source of our database is 
the bank statistics published by the Banks Association of Turkey. Our sample reflects almost the 
entire population of commercial banks in Turkey and is superior to the BankScope database.  
 
4.1 Bank Lending Channel 
 
As shown by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), macroeconomic time series are not helpful in 
identifying a lending channel that is actually the sub-channel of a credit channel. Aggregate 
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data do not allow us to distinguish between supply and demand factors that affect bank lending 
activities. Disaggregated data on banks, on the other hand, may effectively capture the 
distributional effects of monetary policy through a lending channel.  
The presence of a lending channel is typically tested by assuming three bank 
characteristics. Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) consider the size 
of banks as one of these characteristics. It is assumed that small banks are more prone to the 
problem of information asymmetry than large banks and that large banks can issue market 
instruments such as certificate of deposits. This implies a higher sensitivity of small banks to 
monetary policy shocks. The second bank characteristic is liquidity. Evidence provided by 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Ehrmann et al (2003) shows that liquid banks can insulate their 
loan portfolios by reducing their liquid assets, while less liquid banks are unable to do so. 
Finally, bank capitalisation is another characteristic used in some BLC models. Peek and 
Rosengren (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006) argue that poorly capitalised banks 
reduce their loan supply more than well capitalised banks after a monetary contraction, due to 
their limited ability to tap into uninsured sources of funds. Hence, the size, liquidity and 
capitalisation of banks are all expected to be positively correlated with bank loans. 
Two approaches are employed in the empirical literature for testing the bank lending 
channel. One is to divide banks by size, capitalisation and liquidity (e.g. Kashyap and Stein 
(1995, 2000); Kishan and Opiela (2000, 2006); Altunbas et al (2002)). This approach requires a 
large number of banks, which is not a problem for the USA, however, the number of banks in 
Turkey is relatively small so such an approach is not feasible. The alternative approach is to use 
a panel data model that allows the reaction of bank loans to monetary policy to become 
dependent on the bank characteristics, as in Ehrmann et al (2003). This approach avoids the 
above problem associated with the number of banks, and this is used in our paper. The authors 
develop a model of the loans market that draws upon Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The 
solution of their model yields an equation for bank loans that relates the response of bank 
loans to monetary policy both directly (via the money channel) and to bank characteristics 
(through the bank lending channel). Following Ehrmann et al (2003) the dynamic panel data 
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model that relates bank loan growth to monetary policy both directly and indirectly is specified 
as follows:
5
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where  represents bank loans, , denotes the short-term interbank money market rate,  
is the real (2005 base year) GDP growth rate and  gives the rate of inflation – the latter two 
variables are proxies for the demand for loans while the former indicates the policy stance.
6
  
denote the % = 1, 2, 3 bank specific characteristic variables: size *+,, liquidity *-, and 
capital *./,.7 Further,  represents the natural logarithm operator, Δ the first-difference 
operator, 0 = 1, 2, … ,  and 2 = 1, 2, … , 3, where  is the number of banks, and 3 the number 
of time periods. Finally, we allow for fixed-effects across banks with . 
Following Ehrmann et al (2003) and Gambacorta (2005), amongst others, we define the 
bank characteristic variables as: 
 
+ = / − ∑ 56789:88;<=8   (2) 
 
- = >789789 −
?∑ @AB89B89 C:88;<:8 D
E   (3) 
                                                          
5
 We found that one lag was sufficient to deal with autocorrelation and enabled us to avoid unduly over-
parameterised specifications.  
6
 The three macroeconomic variables are not bank specific (so only vary through time) and their data is taken from 
IMF International Financial Statistics downloaded via the ESDS data service. The interest rate (measured as a 
proportion) is taken from line 60B..ZF, nominal GDP from line 99B..ZF, the GDP price deflator from line 99BIPZF 
(these two series are used to construct real GDP) and the consumer price index, used to construct inflation, from 
line 64...ZF. Due to the relatively high levels of inflation in Turkey over our period of study we use the standard 
growth rate formula, 
F9F9G<F9G< , rather than the log approximation to construct the inflation and GDP growth 
variables. 
7
 We denote efficiency (discussed below) with H. 
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./ = I89789 −
?∑ @J89B89C:88;<:8 D
E   (4) 
 
where, / denotes a bank’s total assets, / represents a bank’s liquid assets (cash, 
interbank lending and securities), . gives bank capital and reserves (total equity) and  is the 
number of time-series observations that are available for the 0! bank. All three bank 
characteristics are normalised with respect to their averages across all banks in the sample to 
ensure that they sum to zero across the full sample so that the   coefficients in (1) are directly 
interpretable as the monetary policy effects for the average bank – see Gambacorta (2005, p. 
1744). In order to eliminate the trend in the size bank characteristic *+,, the sample is 
normalised not only over the whole period but also over each single period –  see Ehrmann et 
al. (2003). 
As has already been discussed the interaction term of the bank specific characteristics 
with the short-term interest rate should capture the distributional effects of the monetary 
policy stance. It is assumed that small, less liquid and less capitalised banks should respond 
more strongly to monetary policy changes compared with large, more liquid and more 
capitalised banks. Following Matousek and Sarantis (2009), MS hereafter, we test the following 
three related hypotheses of the existence of a bank lending channel. First, if 
KL∆56>89K∆N89GOKP89G< > 0 
this implies that the lending of large banks is less sensitive to a change in the monetary policy 
stance than the lending of small banks. A second hypothesis is that more liquid banks can 
extend their lending by reducing their stock of liquid assets, which implies, 
KL∆56>89K∆N89GOK>S89G< > 0. In 
other words, less liquid banks have to contract their loan portfolio. Third, more capitalised 
banks are less sensitive to changes in monetary policy stance, such that, 
KL∆56>89K∆N89GOKITU89G< > 0. 
Hence the existence of a BLC suggests that the interaction terms will have positive coefficients 
in (1).   
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The model given by (1) includes cross-sectional fixed-effects and a lagged dependent 
variable which, in a panel with a relatively small time-series dimension (T is at most 17), 
requires the use of a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure, such as 
that proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to secure consistency. The GMM estimator ensures 
consistent parameter estimates by choosing instruments for the lagged dependent variable so 
that the sample correlations between the instruments and the model’s error term are as close 
to zero as possible (see Hamilton, 1994). Current and lagged values of the right-hand side 
variables are considered for use as instruments. To test the validity of the over-identifying 
restrictions (or orthogonality conditions) we employ both the Sargan test and Hansen’s J-test. 
Additionally, we test the hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation in the 
disturbance of the first-difference equation using the Arellano and Bond test.
8
 However, if the 
lagged dependent variable is excluded from (1) the model would not need to be instrumented 
and estimation by the standard fixed-effects method would be appropriate (unless there were 
other endogenous covariates). 
We use unbalanced panel data where not all banks feature over the whole sample. 
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) argue that estimates using unbalanced panel data may give rise to a 
selectivity bias because of the selection of observed banks or the correlation between the 
selection process and the model’s random effects. Our primary focus is the macroeconomic 
effects on all banks through time so the composition of banks is unlikely to have a substantial 
impact on our results (unless the composition changes significantly). Nevertheless, we consider 
whether such selectivity effects may have affected our inference by applying Verbeek and 
Nijman’s (1992) variable addition test.
9
 Three dummy variables are constructed to capture the 
selectivity effects of banks entry and exit during the sample period. The first dummy, , is 
defined as the number of years that a bank features in the sample. The second, #, is unity if a 
bank is absent for at least one year in the sample and is zero otherwise. The third, , is unity 
for a particular period if the bank was absent from the sample in the previous year and is zero 
                                                          
8
 Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the consistency of the GMM estimators depends crucially on the assumption 
that there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals.  
9
 Although two alternative tests (LM and quasi-Hausman) could be applied they are computationally demanding 
whereas the variable addition test is not and performs reasonably (exhibiting quite good power). 
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otherwise. If any dummy variable is found to be significant (either individually or jointly) there 
is evidence of selection bias, otherwise the null of no bias cannot be rejected. 
 
4.2 Cost efficiency 
 
Empirical studies apply two approaches to measure bank outputs and costs in banking 
(Sealey and Lindley (1977), Berger and Humphrey (1997)). The production approach considers 
that banks produce accounts of various sizes by processing deposits and loans. The 
intermediation approach considers banks as transforming deposits and purchased funds into 
loans and other assets. These two approaches have been applied in different ways depending 
on the availability of data and the purpose of the study. Inputs include the price of capital, price 
of labour and price of funds. In this study, we assume that in carrying out their production 
process Turkish banks use three input variables: price of labour, assets and deposits. 
Specifically, the price of labour (P1) is calculated as personnel expenses over number of 
employees; the price of assets (P2) is measured as non-interest expenses over total assets; and 
the price of deposits (P3) is measured as interest expenses over deposits. On the output side, 
we assume that banks produce three outputs: (Y1) loans, (Y2) securities and (Y3) off-balance 
sheet assets. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs used in the 
empirical analysis. 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) pointed out that the approach selected depends upon the aim 
of the research. They argue that the production approach is appropriate in the case of the cost 
efficiency of banks and that this approach focuses on the operating costs of banking. The 
second approach, the intermediation approach, deals with the overall costs of banking and is 
therefore suitable when one wants to consider issues about the economic viability of banks. 
The estimation of a cost function, however, allows an examination of input inefficiencies 
only. Berger et al. (1993) argue in favour of a profit function for examining banking inefficiency. 
It is difficult to implement the profit function approach in Turkey because of the data quality. 
The data on profits are extremely unreliable being greatly affected by the sub-optimal level of 
loan provisions, resulting in only ‘paper’ profits. Moreover, since the profit function specifies 
17 
 
both inputs and outputs, the number of parameters is significantly higher than that for a cost 
function. Thus, degrees of freedom become a more severe constraint. Therefore, estimating 
the cost function is the most feasible approach and this is the focus of our discussion in 
measuring efficiency, however, we also construct efficiency measures using the profit function. 
Thus, cost efficiency is measured using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) that can be written as 
follows: 
 
ln TCi,t = xi,t β + (Vi,t + Ui,t)     (5) 
 
where t denotes the time dimension, ln TCi  is the logarithm of the cost of production of the i-th bank, 
xi is a kx1 vector of input prices and output quantities of the i-th bank, β is a vector of unknown 
parameters, Vi are random variables which are assumed to be i.i.d N(0, σ
2
v) and independent of Ui, Ui 
are non-negative random variables which are assumed to account for cost inefficiency and to be i.i.d. 
as truncations at zero of the N(0, σU
2
).  
Following an approach similar to Radić et al. 2012, we use the following translog functional 
form
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where lnTCkt  (ln TP) is the natural logarithm of total cost (total profit) of bank k in period t, Yi is 
the vector of output quantities, Pj are the input prices, E represents bank’s shareholder equity 
capital and is included as a fixed input, specifying interaction terms with both output and input 
prices in line with recent studies (see e.g. Altunbas et al., 2000; Vander Vennet, 2002; and Radić 
                                                          
10
 The choice of using the translog functional form is motivated by two main reasons. First, Altunbas and 
Chakravarty (2001) identify some problems associated with more flexible functional forms like the Fourier 
(Mitchell and Onvural, 1996) when dealing with heterogeneous data sets. Secondly, Berger and Mester (1997) 
observe that the translog and the Fourier-flexible are substantially equivalent from an economic viewpoint and 
both rank individual bank efficiency in almost the same order. 
ktktkt uv +=ε
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et al., 2012). We use this functional form to estimate a model for a single frontier of 
commercial banks operating in Turkey. Unlike, Coelli et al. (1999) and Radić et al. (2012) we do 
not attempt to account for heterogeneity including environmental conditions, or firm-specific 
factors. We expect to account for bank-specific factors in our main econometric approach. 
Lastly, we expect more efficient banks to be better able to maintain loans as interest 
rates rise than less efficient banks via the BLC, as specified in equation (1). This motivates our 
hypothesis of a positive correlation between the change in the interest rate interacted with 
efficiency and the growth of loans. We also expect a positive correlation between the non-
interacted efficiency variable and loan growth. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot, respectively, the cost and profit measures of efficiency for 
each bank through time. Both measures clearly demonstrate that every bank has become more 
efficient over the period 1991 – 2007. This is consistent with the notion that the liberalisation 
and restructuring processes in the early 1990s and 2001 has had the expected effect on the 
Turkish banking system in terms of improved performance. This contrasts with the finding of 
Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas (2008) and Demir et al (2007), among others. 
Table 5 gives the average of the efficiency measures by the type of bank. Surprisingly, 
foreign banks have a lower average efficiency than domestic banks according to both measures. 
This result is inconsistent with our hypothesis that foreign banks should be more efficient than 
domestic banks [Isik and Hassan (2002), Mercan and Yolalan, (2000), De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2006)]. When we divide domestic banks in to privately-owned and state-owned banks we find 
that the latter are, on average, the most (least) efficient type of bank using the cost (profit) 
measure of efficiency. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
Table 6 reports estimation results of (1), excluding efficiency variables, based on the 
Arellano and Bond two-step system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) corrected coefficient 
19 
 
standard errors.
11
 The two-step coefficient estimator is asymptotically efficient and robust to 
whatever heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-correlation is modelled by the new 
variance-covariance matrix. The Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors greatly reduces 
the problem of biased coefficient standard errors associated with the two-step estimator, 
especially when the number of instruments is large. The rule of thumb is to keep the number of 
instruments below the number of cross-sections to ensure valid inference. We therefore use 
the dependent variable lagged two periods and deeper as “collapsed” GMM-style instruments 
to keep their number down and avoid overfitting the endogenous variable (collapsing 
instruments in this way does come at the loss of some efficiency). We also restrict the IV-style 
instruments to be the same for each model, being the current value and first lag of each of Δ,   and .12  Consequently 22 instruments are used in all of our models estimated by 
GMM, which is less than the 24 cross-sections in our panel data.  
There is no evidence of invalid instruments according to Hansen’s J-test and the Sargan 
test with the exception of the model containing only the liquidity bank characteristic variable 
(in the column headed liq) – the probability values of these two tests are reported as p(Hansen) 
and p(Sargan), respectively.
13
 This suggests that it is important to include either size and/or 
capital bank characteristics in the model to secure instrument validity. There is also no evidence 
of second order autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic residuals – the probability value of this test 
is reported as p[AR(2)]. Therefore, with the exception of the model reported in the column 
headed liq the models are presented as valid for inference.
14
 
We report eight models in Table 6. The first seven all contain the current and first lagged 
value of Δ,   and . The differences in these models lie in the bank characteristic 
variables that are included. The first three models include variables based on one bank 
                                                          
11
 In “… difference GMM regressions on simulated panels, Windmeijer finds that the two-step efficient GMM 
performs somewhat better than one-step in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. And the 
reported two-step standard errors, with his correction, are quite accurate, so that two-step estimation with 
corrected standard errors seems modestly superior to robust one-step.” Roodman (2006, p. 11). 
12
 Lags of the bank characteristics were excluded from the IV-style instrument set to keep the number of 
instruments below the number of cross-sectional units.  
13
 Hansen’s J-test is robust to non-spherical disturbances while Sargan’s test is not robust to non-spherical 
disturbances (it is inconsistent). 
14
 We also note that all models have significant explanatory power according to the Wald test for the joint 
exclusion of all of the variables in the model – the probability value of this test is denoted as p(Wald). 
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characteristic (being size, liquidity or capital): the lag of that characteristic and the lag of that 
variables interaction with the current and lagged value of Δ (respectively). The next three 
models include variables based on two bank characteristics (size and liquidity, size and capital 
or liquidity and capital) and include three way interaction terms with Δ and its lagged value. 
The seventh (pseudo-general) model incorporates variables based on all three bank 
characteristics, however, the three-way interaction covariates are not included because such a 
model could not be estimated due to collinearity problems. The t-ratios, reported in 
parentheses below coefficients, indicate that virtually all of the variables in our models are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. To assess whether this genuinely implies that these 
variables are not significant determinants of the growth in loans or if there are efficiency 
problems with the estimated models, we employ a general-to specific search for a 
parsimonious model. 
The final model (reported in the column headed specific of Table 6) was obtained by 
applying the general-to-specific model reduction method to the pseudo-general model by 
sequentially deleting insignificant variables (tested jointly against the pseudo-general model) 
until only significant variables remained in the model. We then conducted variable addition 
tests for each of the three-way interaction terms to see if they were statistically significant. Our 
parsimonious specific model includes only significant variables.
15
 Further, the joint restrictions 
placed on the pseudo-general model to obtain the specific model could not be rejected at the 
5% level – where p(restrict) is the probability value of the test for these restrictions.
16
 The 
significant variables in this parsimonious model are the first lag of GDP growth, the first lag of 
size and the interaction between lagged liquidity and the current change in the interest rate. 
While GDP growth has the expected positive sign the other two variables have unexpected 
negative signs. We expect both interacted and non-interacted size, liquidity and capitalisation 
variables to have positive coefficients although MS (p. 328) do offer a “dynamic lending 
                                                          
15
 We do apply a prejudiced search in our general-to-specific modelling in the sense that we never exclude the 
lagged dependent variable (even if appears to be insignificant) or the intercept. This is because these variables are 
defining characteristics of the Arellano and Bond system estimator and their exclusion means that we are no 
longer using this estimator. We consider alternative estimation methods below.  
16
 Only one of the other models nested within the pseudo-general model rejected the joint exclusion restrictions 
imposed (being the model that only includes the size bank characteristic variables). This suggests that size is an 
important determinant of loans growth using this estimation method.   
21 
 
activities” rationalisation for a negative coefficient on the non-interacted size variable. Bank 
loans are expected to be related to monetary policy (interest rates) directly through the money 
lending channel and indirectly (interaction terms with interest rates) via the bank lending 
channel. We find no support for a direct effect and whilst there is evidence of an indirect effect 
the negative coefficient on the liquidity interaction term is unexpected. Hence these results do 
not support the bank lending channel hypothesis.  
Table 7 reports the probability values of t-tests for the addition of non-interacted and 
two- and three-way interacted efficiency variables (using both cost and profit measures) to the 
models displayed in Table 6. For only 5 out of the 144 tests (3%) conducted can the efficiency 
variables be added with statistical significance at the 5% level. In three of these cases, three-
way interaction terms (the profit measure of VΔ./ and both cost and profit 
measures of VΔ-) are significant when added to the model that only includes 
capital bank-specific characteristics. However, from Table 6 this model that only includes the 
bank-specific characteristic capital is not a valid simplification of the pseudo general model, 
suggesting that significant variables are excluded from this model. Hence, the significance of 
the three efficiency covariates when added to this model may be due to omitted variable bias. 
The other two cases where efficiency variables are significant is for two-way interacted terms 
(both cost and profit measures of VΔ) when they are added to the parsimonious 
specific model from Table 6. This latter result suggests that further investigation of the role of 
efficiency variables is warranted. Indeed, the general insignificance of efficiency variables may 
be due to inefficient estimation arising from overparameterisation of many of the models. 
Hence, we apply a new general-to-specific search with the non-interacted and two-way 
interacted efficiency variables included in the general model to further explore the role of this 
variable.
17
  
In Table 8 we report general and specific models when the general specification of (1) 
includes non-interacted and two-way interacted bank-characteristic and efficiency variables.
18
 
                                                          
17
 We note that in all five cases where efficiency was found to be significant it had a theoretically unexpected sign 
which casts some doubt on our ability to uncover a theoretically plausible significant relationship between 
efficiency and the growth of bank loans. 
18
 Three-way interacted terms could not be incorporated in the general models in addition to the variables already 
included because estimation would fail. Since the evidence from Table 7 (Table 6) suggests that two-way 
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These are estimated using the Arellano and Bond method. Two specific models are reported 
when the cost efficiency measure is used. The first (denoted as Specific 1) is the result of 
applying the general-to-specific method in the standard way. The second (Specific 2) simply 
adds the efficiency variable found to be significant in Table 7 *VΔ, to the specific 
model reported in Table 6. Regarding the profit measure of efficiency the standard application 
of the general-to-specific method yielded the specific model reported in Table 6 (with no 
efficiency variables included). Hence, for this measure of efficiency we only provide estimates 
for the specific model from Table 6 with VΔ added. All models are free from evident 
misspecification, except for Specific 1, where the Sargan test indicates invalid instruments at 
the 5% level, if not the 1% level (the more appropriate Hansen test cannot reject the validity of 
instruments). In addition, the restrictions imposed to obtain the specific models from their 
corresponding general counterparts cannot be rejected. Further, all models have significant 
explanatory power according to the Wald test except for the general specification using the 
cost measure of efficiency – this apparent insignificance is likely related to too many variables 
featuring in the general model and highlights the need to use parsimonious specifications for 
inference.  
All three specific models include  VΔ as a significant variable with a 
negatively signed coefficient. This negative coefficient is inconsistent with a theoretically 
plausible efficiency effect working through the BLC. Further, two of these specific models 
include an insignificant covariate, , suggesting the model can be improved by further 
model reduction while the other specific regression has some evidence of invalid instruments. 
Overall, we do not favour any of the specific models reported in Table 8 and suggest that the 
specific regression presented in Table 6 is the least unsatisfactory of those estimated using the 
Arellano and Bond method. This implies that there is no significant impact of efficiency on the 
growth of bank loans. 
The motivation for using the Arellano and Bond estimation method is the dynamic 
specification in terms of including a lagged dependent variable. However, the results in Table 6 
indicate that the lagged dependent variable is unambiguously insignificant (in all models). This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interacted terms are the most likely efficiency (bank-characterstic) variables to be significant the exclusion of 
three-way interaction terms should not cause any omitted variable bias. 
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suggests that it can be excluded from the model.
19
 In this case it is not necessary to employ the 
Arellano and Bond estimator and the standard fixed-effects (FE) estimator may be employed. 
Table 9 reports the first seven models from Table 6 (excluding the lagged dependent 
variable) re-estimated using cross-sectional fixed effects.
20
 Table 13 reports a general model 
(including all variables considered) and a parsimonious model (obtained using the general-to-
specific method) estimated using cross-sectional fixed effects – these models are indicated with 
the column headings General and Specific(FE), respectively. The probability value of a t-test for 
the addition of a first-order autoregressive term to each model {denoted p[AR(1)]} indicates no 
significant autocorrelation, confirming that there is no need for a dynamic specification and 
suggests that all models are free from evident misspecification. However, the model that 
includes just liquidity based variables (see the column headed liq) and the model with size and 
liquidity variables (see the column headed size, liq) are not valid simplifications of the general 
model in the sense that the restrictions placed on the latter to obtain the former are rejected – 
see p(F, restrict). All other models are valid simplifications of the general model. Further, all 
models feature significant explanatory power [p(F,R
2
=0) denotes the probability value of the F-
test for the null R
2
=0] and many of the variables’ coefficients are individually significant 
according to t-tests (based on White’s heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors).
21
 It is 
particularly noteworthy that the current and lagged value of the interest rate variable, Δ, are 
negative and significant in all regressions. This provides unambiguous support for the notion 
that bank loans are directly affected by monetary policy through the money lending channel 
and is in contrast with the results obtained using the GMM estimation method. Another 
unambiguous finding is that neither the cost nor the profit based efficiency measures have a 
significant impact on bank loans in any model, which is consistent with the results from Table 6.  
                                                          
19
 Using the difference of the log-level of loans as the dependent variable implies that the log-level of loans is 
related to its lagged value. Hence, while there are no evident dynamics in the growth of loans dynamics are implicit 
in the log-levels.  
20
 We cannot add time period fixed-effects because macroeconomic variables (Δ,   and ) only exhibit 
variation through time and not across the banks and so would be perfectly collinear with any period effects. 
21
 Since our tests indicate no evidence of autocorrelation we do not correct our coefficient standard errors for 
autocorrelation. 
24 
 
The parsimonious model based on the FE estimator is reported in the column headed 
Specific(FE) in Table 13.
22
 In addition to clearly supporting a direct negative impact of interest 
rates on loans through the money lending channel this model also suggests an indirect effect 
through the three-way interaction term of Δ with lagged liquidity and lagged capital. This 
three-way interaction is significant and has the expected positive sign. This parsimonious model 
also suggests that the lagged value of capital has the expected positive (and significant) 
influence on bank loans. All other variables except the intercept are not statistically significant.  
In Table 10 and 14 we report the probability values of t-tests for the addition of non-
interacted and two- and three-way interacted efficiency variables (using both cost and profit 
measures) to the models given in Table 9 and 13. For only 12 out of the 126 tests (10%) 
reported in Table 10 can the efficiency variables be added with statistical significance at the 5% 
level. However, the significance of these efficiency covariates may be due to omitted variable 
bias because each model excludes some bank-characteristic variables. Arguably the variable 
addition tests applied to the models based upon the general-to-specific model reduction 
method will be more informative because they should not be subject to any omitted variable 
bias. Such tests are reported in Table 14 and show that none of the efficiency variables can be 
added to the general or specific models that are estimated by fixed-effects. Hence, these 
results indicate that there are no evidently significant efficiency effects. 
However, it is important to notice that the F-test for the exclusion of the fixed-effects 
[the probability value is denoted by p(F, FE)] suggests that the fixed-effects are redundant in all 
regressions reported in Table 9 and 13. Hence, these fixed-effects should be excluded because 
it is inefficient to include them when they are insignificant. This may seem surprising because 
one would expect heterogeneity between banks. However, it should be remembered that the 
dependent variable is the difference of the natural logarithm of bank loans and that 
differencing is a standard method for eliminating fixed-effects from a model (this is the method 
that the Arellano and Bond estimation technique employs).
23
 Thus, the difference specification 
of our model suggests that we can apply the pooled OLS estimation method.
24
 
                                                          
22
 This parsimonious model has the lowest value of the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) out of those estimated 
by FE, which confirms its status as the favoured FE specification.  
23
 One might wonder why we have not applied a specification in log-levels (without the differencing). The reason is 
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Table 11 reports the same seven specifications given in Table 9 re-estimated using 
pooled OLS. Table 13 reports a general model (including all variables considered) and a 
parsimonious model (obtained using the general-to-specific method) estimated using pooled 
OLS - these models are indicated with the column headings General and Specific(OLS), 
respectively. According to p[AR(1)] there is no significant autocorrelation in any model, which 
suggests all models are free from evident misspecification and confirms that there is no need 
for a dynamic specification. All models are valid simplifications of the general model except for 
the one including both size and liquidity variables (reported in the column headed size, liq) – 
see p(F, restrict). All models exhibit significant explanatory power according to p(F,R
2
=0) and 
many of the variables’ coefficients are individually significant according to t-tests (based on 
White’s heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors). As for the models reported in Table 9, 
both the current and lagged value of the interest rate variable, Δ, are negative and significant 
in all regressions reported in Table 11. This provides unambiguous support for the notion that 
bank loans are directly affected by monetary policy through the money lending channel and is 
consistent with the inference obtained from the FE estimation method but contrasts with the 
results found using GMM. Consistent with the results reported in both Table 6 and Table 9 we 
find that neither the cost nor the profit based efficiency measures have a significant impact on 
bank loans.  
The parsimonious model based on the pooled OLS estimator is the model that we favour 
for inference and is reported in the column headed Specific(OLS) in Table 13.
25
 In addition to 
clearly supporting a direct negative impact of interest rates on loans through the money 
lending channel this model also suggests an indirect effect through the three-way interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to deal with nonstationarity. Variables such as GDP and prices (as well as bank loans) are intrinsically nonstationary 
in growing and inflationary economies such as Turkey. Hence, one needs differencing (or to use growth rates) to 
induce stationarity and so avoid the spurious regression phenomenon which can occur when the dependent 
variable is nonstationary and the regressors are either stationary or nonstationary – see, for examples, Stewart 
(2006) and Ventosa-Santaularia (2009). 
24
 Whilst there may be cross-sectional heterogeneity in the log-levels of bank loans there does not appear to be 
significant heterogeneity across banks for the differenced log-levels of bank loans. 
25
 This parsimonious model has the lowest value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) out of the models 
estimated by both pooled OLS and FE. Although it does not exhibit the smallest SIC the lagged GDP variable is 
statistically significant and its inclusion is expected theoretically. On balance, we choose it as the favoured 
specification, although the model estimated by pooled OLS and excluding , reported as Specific(FE) in 
Table 13, yields qualitatively the same inference in terms of the lending channel (which is our primary interest).  
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term of Δ with lagged liquidity and lagged capital. This three-way interaction is significant and 
has the expected positive sign. This parsimonious model suggests that the lagged value of 
capital has the expected positive influence on bank loans (and is significant). The lagged value 
of GDP is also significant and its coefficient has a plausible positive sign. All other variables 
except the intercept are not statistically significant. The inclusion of lagged GDP in the model 
estimated by pooled OLS is the only substantive difference from the parsimonious model 
chosen based on FE estimation. We suggest that this is due to the increased efficiency secured 
by excluding the redundant (in our application) fixed-effects.
26
  
In Table 12 and 14 we report the probability values of t-tests for the addition of non-
interacted and two- and three-way interacted efficiency variables (using both cost and profit 
measures) to the models given in Table 11 and 13. For only 12 out of the 126 tests (10%) 
reported in Table 12 can the efficiency variables be added with statistical significance at the 5% 
level. However, the significance of these efficiency covariates may be due to omitted variable 
bias because each model excludes some bank-characteristic variables. Arguably the variable 
addition tests applied to the models based upon the general-to-specific model reduction 
method will be more informative because they should not be subject to any omitted variable 
bias. Such tests are reported in Table 14 and show that none of the efficiency variables can be 
added to the general or specific models that are estimated by pooled-OLS. Hence, these results 
indicate that there are no evidently significant efficiency effects. 
The static long-run solutions implied by the parsimonious dynamic models obtained by 
the three estimation methods that we consider are reported in Table 15.
27
 In the long-run 
model based on GMM estimation bank loans are not directly influenced by monetary policy 
through the monetary lending channel because the Δ variable is excluded. This contrasts with 
the models estimated by FE and OLS where the coefficient on Δ is significant and has a 
negative coefficient that is consistent with the existence of a monetary lending channel. From 
                                                          
26
 In Table 13 we report the parsimonious model estimated by FE with lagged GDP added in the column headed 
Specific(OLS). This variable is insignificant at the 5% level which contrasts with its significance in the parsimonious 
model estimated by pooled OLS. This change in significance between different estimation methods is consistent 
with efficiency effects.  
27
 Approximate coefficient standard errors of the long-run coefficients that are used to construct t-ratios are 
calculated using the method discussed in De Boef and Keele (2008). 
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the favoured model estimated by OLS we find that an increase in the change in interest rate by 
one percentage point causes the growth of loans to fall by around 1.3 percentage points (which 
seems to be of a reasonable order of magnitude). This suggests that loans are quite responsive 
to direct monetary policy in Turkey. Regarding indirect monetary policy effects in the long-run 
we find that the liquidity multiplied by Δ interaction term is significant but features an 
implausible negative sign in the model estimated by GMM. In contrast, both the models 
estimated by FE and OLS indicate that the product of capital, liquidity and Δ is significant and 
has an expected positive coefficient. Given that we base our inference on the model estimated 
by OLS we conclude that monetary policy has an indirect effect on bank loans through the bank 
lending channel.  
Although bank size features in the GMM specification it exhibits an unexpected sign and 
is statistically insignificant. Given that this variable does not feature in the models estimated by 
FE and OLS we conclude that size is not a significant long-run determinant of bank loan growth. 
Indeed, capital is the only bank-specific variable that determines bank loans in the long-run 
given that it is significant in the models estimated by OLS and FE (if not GMM). This variable’s 
coefficient has the anticipated positive sign. GDP growth is significant and features the 
expected positive sign in the models estimated by OLS and GMM, if not the one estimated by 
FE. We argue that the insignificance of this variable in the FE model is due to its inefficiency and 
conclude that GDP growth is a significant determinant of the growth of bank loans in the long-
run. 
To the extent that we can test for selection bias (following the procedure adopted in MS 
p. 327) we find that the dummy variables , # and  are not significant, which indicates no 
selection bias arising from the unbalanced panel – see Table 16.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
In contrast to much of the previous literature we find that it is not necessary to use the 
Arellano and Bond procedure to estimate a model of Turkish bank loan growth because the 
lagged dependent variable is never found to be significant. We note that in some applications 
of GMM to such models, for example Gambacorta (2005) and Olivero et al (2011), the lagged 
dependent variable is not reported, hence, it is not obvious that this variable is required as a 
regressor in their application. Similarly, the lagged dependent variable is not significant in 19 
out of the 42 (45%) regressions (for 6 countries) reported by Matousek and Sarantis (2009). 
Hence, the use of GMM may not be warranted in many instances in the literature.
28
 Indeed, we 
find no need to account for bank-specific fixed-effects and favour inference from the basic 
pooled OLS estimator. We argue that neither a dynamic specification nor fixed-effects are 
required because our model involves differenced variables (in line with the existing literature) 
that are used to help induce stationarity and avoid spurious inference – differencing embodies 
dynamics and removes fixed-effects in the log-level of bank loans. Our results suggest that 
determining which estimation method is most appropriate is crucially important because it has 
a substantial impact upon inference. For example, including unnecessary dynamics by using the 
Arellano and Bond GMM method would indicate that monetary policy has no direct impact 
upon bank loans through interest rates while applying the inefficient fixed-effects estimator 
would indicate that GDP growth is not significantly related to loans. Hence, we suggest that it is 
important that authors report and check whether the lagged dependent variable is significant 
when applying the Arellano and Bond estimation procedure and test whether fixed-effects are 
required when using the fixed-effects method. 
Our favoured model, estimated by pooled OLS, suggests that, in the long-run, the 
growth in bank loans is related to monetary policy directly through the money lending channel 
                                                          
28
 Indeed, Goddard and Wilson (2009), within the context of the Rosse-Panzar test for the degree of 
competitiveness, note the while FE coefficient estimates are severely biased when the lagged dependent variable’s 
coefficient in the data generation process (DGP) is non-zero, they are unbiased when the lagged dependent 
variable does not appear in the DGP. Bikker et al (2012) in their investigation of bank competitiveness in 
international countries also find little evidence of a significant lagged dependent variable when using the Arellano 
and Bond method in their empirical analysis and consequently prefer inference from the fixed-effects estimator. 
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(via interest rates) and indirectly (when liquidity and capital are interacted with interest rates) 
via the bank lending channel. Further, both capital and GDP growth have plausible positive and 
significant long-run effects on bank loan growth, whereas inflation, size and, in particular, 
efficiency do not have a significant equilibrium relationship with loan growth. 
Despite our finding that efficiency does not affect the growth of loans we do find 
unambiguous evidence that both the cost and profit measures of efficiency for all banks in our 
sample increased over the period 1991 – 2007. This is consistent with the notion that the 
liberalisation and restructuring processes in the early 1990s and 2001 has had the expected 
effect on the Turkish banking system in terms of improved performance. Our results contrast 
with finding of a decline in Turkish banking efficiency after the liberalisation and restructuring 
process reported by Ozkan-Gunay and Tektas (2008) and Demir et al (2007), among others. 
However, we also obtain the unexpected finding that domestic banks are, on average, more 
efficient than foreign banks, which is inconsistent with the work of Isik and Hassan (2002), 
Mercan and Yolalan, (2000) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006)]. 
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Table 1: Turkish Banking Sector- Basic Market Structure Indicators 
 
 1980 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of Banks 43 66 68 81 79 61 54 50 48 47 46 46 
 Deposit Banks 40 56 55 62 61 46 40 36 35 34 33 33 
 State-owned 12 8 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 Private 24 25 32 31 28 22 20 18 18 17 14 11 
 Foreign 4 23 18 19 18 15 15 13 13 13 15 18 
  SDIF Banks (1) - - - 8 11 6 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 Dev. & Inv. Banks 3 10 13 19 18 15 14 14 13 13 13 13 
Num. of Branches (2) 5,954 6,560 6,240 7,691 7,837 6,908 6,106 5,966 6,106 6,247 6,849 7,618 
Employment (1,000 pers.)  125.3 154.1 144.8 174.0 170.4 137.5 123.3 123.2 127.2 132.3 143.1 158.5 
Asset Concentr’n (CR, %)             
 CR-5 63 54 48 46 48  56 58 60 60 63 63 62 
 CR-10 82 75 71 68 69 80 81 82 84 85 86 85 
Asset Shares (%)             
 Deposit Banks 91 91 93 95 96 95 96 96 96 97 97 97 
 State-owned 44 45 38 35 34 32 32 33 35 31 30 29 
 Private 44 43 52 49 47 56 56 57 57 60 55 52 
 Foreign 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 3 5 12 15 
  SDIF Banks (1) - - - 6 8 4 4 3 1 0 0 0 
 Dev. & Inv. Banks 9 9 7 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 
Table 1 notes: 
1) Banks taken-over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund.  
2) Including foreign branches. 
Source: BAT, Banks in Turkey (various yearly issues). 
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Table 2: Turkish Banking Sector- Selected Financial Indicators/Ratios 
 
 1980 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Volumes (USD, Billion)             
Assets  18.6 58.2 68.9 
133.
5 
154.
9 115 
129.
7 
179.
2 
229.
3 
295.
8 
344.
9 
484.
0 
Loans  10.0 27.3 29.3 40.2 50.9 28.3 34.4 50.2 77.3 
114.
1 
155.
1 
241.
9 
Deposits  9.1 32.6 44.8 89.4 
101.
9 81.0 86.8 
115.
4 
147.
7 
189.
0 
222.
6 
307.
9 
Net Profits 0.3 1.3 1.8 -0.6 -4.7 -3.6 1.4 4.0 4.8 4.3 7.8 12.4 
Own Funds 0.8 4.5 4.2 3.6 7.5 6.7 15.7 25.5 34.4 40.0 41.2 63.4 
Fx Position (1) - -1.8 -3.1 -13.2 -14.5  -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -1.9 -1.8 -5.5 -10.0 
Ratios to GDP (%)             
Assets  32 43 53 69 63 69 61 55 55 61 64 69 
Loans 17 20 23 21 21 17 16 15 19 24 29 34 
Deposits 16 24 34 46 41 49 41 35 35 39 41 42 
Selected Ratios (%) 
            
Loans/Assets 54 47 43 30 33 25 27 28 34 39 45 50 
Non-Deposit Funds/Assets 6 20 14 17 19 16 15 16 15 17 18 16 
Loans/Deposits 110 84 65 45 50 35 40 44 52 60 70 79 
Own Funds/Assets 4 8 6 3 5 6 11 12 13 12 10 11 
Sec. Portfolio/Assets  6 10 11 17 12 10 41 43 40 36 35 31 
NPL/Gross Loans  - 1 1 11 11 25 18 12 6 5 4 4 
Net Profits/Assets  1.3 2.3 2.6 -0.4 -3.0 -3.1 1.1 2.2 2.1 1.4 2.3 2.6 
Net Profits/Own Funds 32 29 42 -16 -62 -53 9 16 14 11 19 20 
Fx Deposits/T. Deposits  - 24 55 50 46 60 58 49 45 37 38 35 
CAR (2) - - - 8 9 21 25 31 28 24 22 19 
Table 2 notes: 
1) On-balance sheet position including fx indexed assets and liabilities.    
2) Capital Adequacy Ratio as regulated by the BRSA (8 percent at minimum).  
Source: BAT, Banks in Turkey (various yearly issues), and the authors’ own calculations. Figures are rounded. 
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Table 3: List of Currently Operating Banks in Turkey 
Rank Bank Ownership as of end-2007 Established 
1 Ziraat (ZIR) State-owned 1863 
2 Isbank (ISB) Privately-owned 1924 
3 Akbank (AKB) Privately-owned 1948 
4 Garanti (GAR) Privately-owned 1946 
5 Yapi Kredi (YAP) Privately-owned 1944 
6 Vakifbank (VAK) State-owned 1954 
7 Halkbank (HAL) State-owned 1938 
8 Finansbank (FIN) Foreign 1987 
9 Denizbank  (DEN) Foreign 1997 
10 HSBC (HSB) Foreign 1990 
11 ING (OYA) [previously OYAK] Foreign 1984 
12 T Ekonomi Bankasi (TKO) Privately-owned 1927 
13 Fortis (DIS) [previously Disbank] Foreign 1964 
14 Sekerbank (SEK) Privately-owned 1953 
15 Citibank (CIT) Foreign 1980 
16 Anadolubank (ANA) Privately-owned 1996 
17 Tekstilbank (TKS) Privately-owned 1986 
18 Tekfenbank (BEK) [previously Bankekspres] Foreign 1992 
19 Alternatifbank (ALT) Privately-owned 1992 
20 ABN Amro (ABN) Foreign 1921 
21 West LB (WES) Foreign 1985 
22 Turkishbank (TUR) Privately-owned 1982 
23 Turkland (MNG) [previously MNG] Foreign 1991 
24 Arab-Turk (ARA) Foreign 1977 
25 Adabank (ADA) Privately-owned 1985 
 
 
 
Table 4.Variables Used to Estimate Cost Efficiency (Mil $US) 
Variables  Loans Securities Off  Balance  PL PC PF TC 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 P1 P2 P3  
Mean 2100.96 1695.00 8578.98 0.03 0.03 11.93 836.81 
Max 32103.76 40177.23 209118.87 0.18 0.12 719.93 8822.90 
Min 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.05 0.14 
Std 4365.04 4553.63 23036.41 0.02 0.02 44.08 1504.76 
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Table 5: Average efficiency by bank type 
 
 Cost measure of efficiency Profit measure of efficiency 
Bank type Average efficiency No. banks Obs. Average efficiency No. banks Obs. 
Foreign 0.920 11 178 0.856 11 178 
Domestic 0.945 14 225 0.861 14 221 
 Private 0.940 11 174 0.873 11 170 
 State-owned 0.960 3 51 0.824 3 51 
Table 5 notes: This table displays the average efficiency by type of bank using both cost and profit 
measures of efficiency in the columns headed “Average efficiency”.  The number of banks (column 
headed “No. banks”) and total number of observations (Obs.) used in the calculation of average 
efficiency are also given. There are two main types of bank being foreign-owned (Foreign) and 
domestically-owned (Domestic) banks. The latter is further broken down in to two sub-categories: 
privately-owned banks (Private) and state-owned (State-owned) banks. 
 
 
  
34 
 
Table 6: Arellano and Bond estimates of (1), excluding efficiency variables 
Model → 
Variable ↓ 
size liq cap size, liq size, cap liq, cap size, liq, cap 
Pseudo general 
specific 
Δ  -0.152 
(-0.835) 
{0.182} 
-0.099 
(-1.082) 
{0.092} 
-0.057 
(-0.564) 
{0.102} 
-0.226 
(-0.534) 
{0.424} 
-0.313 
(-0.625) 
{0.501} 
-0.239 
(-1.377) 
{0.174} 
-0.382 
(-1.565) 
{0.244} 
0.009 
(0.034) 
{0.256} Δ  -0.348 
(-0.296) 
-0.793 
(-0.791) 
-1.157 
(-1.228) 
0.681 
(0.466) 
0.989 
(0.614) 
-0.961 
(-0.272) 
0.641 
(0.398) 
 
Δ  -0.135 
(-0.143) 
0.124 
(0.243) 
-0.537 
(-1.155) 
0.395 
(0.467) 
0.633 
(0.912) 
0.774 
(0.667) 
0.231 
(0.238) 
 
   2.071 
(0.774) 
1.050 
(0.416) 
-2.255 
(-0.936) 
6.003 
(1.224) 
6.453 
(1.871) 
4.738 
(0.623) 
6.666 
(1.992) 
 
  1.455 
(1.361) 
3.180 
(1.295) 
0.542 
(0.461) 
5.342 
(1.243) 
1.512 
(0.358) 
1.354 
(0.179) 
3.709 
(0.936) 
4.322 
(2.440)   0.492 
(0.333) 
0.032 
(0.035) 
1.035 
(1.067) 
-1.397 
(-0.579) 
-0.394 
(-0.299) 
-0.071 
(-0.017) 
-1.019 
(-0.578) 
 
  -0.267 
(-0.183) 
-0.573 
(-0.612) 
-1.114 
(-1.168) 
1.678 
(0.818) 
0.811 
(0.670) 
-0.596 
(-0.155) 
1.155 
(0.856) 
 
+  -0.649 
(-1.673) 
  -0.672 
(-1.866) 
-0.841 
(-3.470) 
 -0.715 
(-1.074) 
-0.905 
(-2.190) +Δ  -0.328 
(-0.110) 
  -0.049 
(-0.034) 
-0.550 
(-0.665) 
 -1.444 
(-0.763) 
 
+Δ  -0.170 
(-0.292) 
  0.350 
(0.335) 
0.729 
(0.697) 
 -0.025 
(-0.030) 
 
-   1.024 
(1.119) 
 0.765 
(0.361) 
 1.908 
(0.619) 
-0.221 
(-0.123) 
 
-Δ   -5.837 
(-0.896) 
 -4.302 
(-0.418) 
 4.675 
(0.212) 
-5.930 
(-0.673) 
-12.674 
(-3.301) -Δ   -5.327 
(-2.064) 
 -0.242 
(-0.028) 
 -10.656 
(-1.020) 
-1.538 
(-0.121) 
 
./    5.205 
(0.806) 
 5.674 
(0.639) 
4.718 
(0.269) 
-2.221 
(-0.394) 
 
./Δ    20.333 
(1.343) 
 0.244 
(0.006) 
-15.367 
(-0.269) 
-30.809 
(-1.672) 
 
./Δ    2.721 
(0.247) 
 19.393 
(2.430) 
10.117 
(0.371) 
3.717 
(0.366) 
 
+-Δ     -1.672 
(-0.237) 
    
+-Δ     -2.846 
(-0.571) 
    
+./Δ      11.179 
(0.658) 
   
+./Δ      14.068 
(1.341) 
   
-./Δ       6.264 
(0.075) 
  
-./Δ       -63.690 
(-0.160) 
  
Intercept 0.268 
(0.621) 
0.363 
(1.534) 
0.486 
(2.915) 
-0.098 
(-0.127) 
0.028 
(0.052) 
0.448 
(0.518) 
-0.086 
(-0.152) 
0.205 
(0.481) 
p[AR(2)] 0.917 0.147 0.600 0.913 0.870 0.790 0.619 0.245 
p(Hansen) 0.682 0.312 0.234 0.838 0.962 0.697 0.853 0.173 
p(Sargan) 0.993 0.000 0.095 0.985 0.989 0.682 0.951 0.228 
p(Wald) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p(restrict) 0.060 0.000 0.005 NA NA NA NA 0.084 
Number of observations 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 257 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Table 6 notes: The dependent variable is the difference of the natural logarithm of loans, Δ. Coefficients for the regressors are reported with t-ratios based upon 
Windmeijer corrected standard errors given in parentheses and figures in braces, {}, are coefficient standard errors (these are only reported for the lagged dependent 
variable). All models are estimated using the same 22 instruments being the collapsed GMM-style instruments of the dependent variable lagged two periods and higher and 
the following IV-style instruments: Δ, Δ,  , ,  and . Probability values for the following tests are also reported. Second-order autocorrelation, 
p[AR(2)], the Hansen test for over-identification restrictions, p(Hansen), the Sargan test for over-identification restrictions, p(Sargan), a Wald test testing the joint significance 
of the slope coefficients, p(Wald) and a joint test of the exclusion restrictions required to obtain the specific model from the pseudo-general specification, p(restrict). All 
estimation results were produced using STATA 11. 
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Table 7: Tests of the addition of efficiency variables to the models reported in Table 6 
Model → 
Variables added ↓ 
size liq cap size, liq size, cap liq, cap size, liq, cap 
Pseudo general 
specific 
Cost measure of efficiency 
p[V] 0.493 0.495 0.147 0.902 0.394 0.287 0.348 0.971 
p[VΔ] 0.982 0.878 0.196 0.897 0.572 0.812 0.871 0.277 
p[VΔ] 0.998 0.988 0.828 0.632 0.722 0.799 0.711 0.027 
p[VΔ+] 0.637 0.097 0.315 0.894 0.798 0.303 0.358 0.347 
p[VΔ+] 0.708 0.845 0.796 0.702 0.929 0.633 0.516 0.422 
p[VΔ-] 0.917 0.555 0.459 0.832 0.768 0.740 0.565 0.987 
p[VΔ-] 0.753 0.440 0.009 0.782 0.919 0.610 0.510 0.247 
p[VΔ./] 0.256 0.137 0.585 0.429 0.985 0.587 0.541 0.295 
p[VΔ./] 0.282 0.935 0.892 0.358 0.906 0.826 0.543 0.745 
Profit measure of efficiency 
p[V] 0.708 0.100 0.164 0.828 0.693 0.464 0.743 0.855 
p[VΔ] 0.890 0.419 0.189 0.929 0.636 0.805 0.702 0.336 
p[VΔ] 0.294 0.493 0.812 0.363 0.659 0.919 0.675 0.031 
p[VΔ+] 0.911 0.124 0.273 0.886 0.926 0.235 0.775 0.288 
p[VΔ+] 0.518 0.864 0.844 0.969 0.939 0.629 0.999 0.360 
p[VΔ-] 0.866 0.374 0.608 0.808 0.713 0.519 0.987 0.493 
p[VΔ-] 0.877 0.956 0.013 0.354 0.971 0.947 0.972 0.307 
p[VΔ./] 0.230 0.218 0.009 0.362 0.686 0.486 0.823 0.375 
p[VΔ./] 0.330 0.836 0.874 0.532 0.672 0.410 0.655 0.404 
Table 7 notes: This table reports the probability values for individual t-tests for the addition of lagged efficiency variables, V, based on 
cost and profit measures both non-interacted and interacted with various combinations of the change in interest rates and bank-specific 
characteristics to the models estimated in Table 6. The results are obtained using the Arellano and Bond two-step system estimator with 
Windmeijer corrected coefficient standard errors implemented in STATA 11. 
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Table 8: Arellano and Bond estimates of (1), including efficiency variables 
 Cost efficiency measure Profit efficiency measure 
Model → 
Variable ↓ 
General Specific 1 Specific 2 General Specific 
Δ -0.482 
(-0.228) 
{2.111} 
-0.035 
(-0.176) 
{0.197} 
-0.023 
(-0.091) 
{0.253} 
-0.501 
(-0.513) 
{0.977} 
-0.030 
(-0.113) 
{0.270} 
Δ  -5.372 
(-0.015) 
  0.558 
(0.025) 
 
Δ  -31.348 
(-0.087) 
  4.302 
(0.138) 
 
   7.103 
(0.220) 
3.200 
(1.971) 
 7.654 
(0.797) 
 
  2.118 
(0.055) 
 2.841 
(1.434) 
1.745 
(0.099) 
2.811 
(1.430)   -0.219 
(-0.017) 
  -0.380 
(-0.078) 
 
  0.708 
(0.082) 
  0.779 
(0.273) 
 
+  -0.664 
(-0.121) 
-0.965 
(-2.734) 
-0.937 
(-2.491) 
-0.495 
(-0.269) 
-0.926 
(-2.547) +Δ  -3.029 
(-0.619) 
  -2.479 
(-0.355) 
 
+Δ  -1.455 
(-0.159) 
  -0.705 
(-0.096) 
 
-  -0.019 
(-0.001) 
  -0.33 
(-0.123) 
 
-Δ  -7.864 
(-0.086) 
-7.268 
(-2.408) 
-14.422 
(-2.677) 
-0.848 
(-0.054) 
-14.564 
(-2.895) -Δ  1.308 
(0.006) 
  -11.426 
(-0.152) 
 
./  3.099 
(0.034) 
  1.130 
(0.134) 
 
./Δ  -45.999 
(-0.234) 
  -28.943 
(-0.287) 
 
./Δ  15.907 
(0.096) 
  11.262 
(0.778) 
 
V 10.854 
(0.065) 
  1.450 
(0.423) 
 
VΔ 6.393 
(0.016) 
  -0.204 
(-0.007) 
 
VΔ 33.492 
(0.092) 
-0.435 
(-2.161) 
-0.572 
(-2.213) 
-4.535 
(-0.141) 
-0.699 
(-2.152) 
Intercept -10.502 
(-0.066) 
0.475 
(1.027) 
0.324 
(0.755) 
-1.430 
(-0.453) 
0.317 
(0.740) 
p[AR(2)] 0.949 0.541 0.157 0.973 0.204 
p(Hansen) 0.942 0.440 0.193 0.469 0.197 
p(Sargan) 0.992 0.048 0.466 0.533 0.474 
p(Wald) 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p(restrict) NA 0.985 0.999 NA 0.186 
Number of observations 257 257 257 257 257 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 22 22 
Table 8 notes: see notes to Table 6.  
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Table 9: Fixed-effects estimates of (1), excluding efficiency variables 
Model → 
Variable ↓ 
size liq cap size, liq size, cap liq, cap size, liq, cap 
 Δ  -1.923 
(-4.721) 
-1.872 
(-5.778) 
-1.691 
(-4.644) 
-1.938 
(-4.956) 
-1.790 
(-4.937) 
-1.813 
(-4.467) 
-1.885 
(-4.565) Δ  -0.670 
(-3.505) 
-0.592 
(-4.138) 
-0.610 
(-3.543) 
-0.627 
(-3.948) 
-0.623 
(-3.253) 
-0.568 
(-3.367) 
-0.587 
(-3.414)    -1.355 
(-1.062) 
-1.431 
(-1.372) 
-1.163 
(-1.002) 
-1.527 
(-1.214) 
-1.462 
(-1.211) 
-1.759 
(-1.427) 
-1.609 
(-1.204)   1.074 
(2.199) 
1.519 
(3.695) 
0.905 
(1.691) 
1.368 
(2.731) 
0.896 
(1.746) 
1.488 
(2.928) 
1.304 
(2.738)   1.205 
(2.336) 
1.121 
(2.520) 
1.069 
(2.192) 
1.204 
(2.474) 
1.173 
(2.430) 
1.226 
(2.303) 
1.193 
(2.259)   -1.412 
(-2.671) 
-1.350 
(-3.055) 
-1.174 
(-2.492) 
-1.469 
(-2.860) 
-1.321 
(-2.738) 
-1.439 
(-2.728) 
-1.420 
(-2.662) +  -0.145 
(-2.327) 
  -0.134 
(-1.986) 
-0.083 
(-1.227) 
 -0.072 
(-1.125) +Δ  0.018 
(0.272) 
  0.022 
(0.234) 
0.077 
(1.185) 
 0.081 
(1.041) +Δ  0.006 
(0.147) 
  -0.034 
(-0.842) 
0.019 
(0.307) 
 -0.020 
(-0.278) -   0.096 
(0.353) 
 0.112 
(0.400) 
 0.424 
(1.546) 
0.326 
(1.156) -Δ   -0.890 
(-2.215) 
 -0.979 
(-1.980) 
 0.148 
(0.275) 
0.112 
(0.217) -Δ   -0.871 
(-1.642) 
 -0.754 
(-1.380) 
 -0.443 
(-0.722) 
-0.628 
(-1.010) ./    1.649 
(2.401) 
 1.360 
(2.118) 
1.931 
(2.848) 
1.549 
(2.320) ./Δ    2.913 
(1.752) 
 3.499 
(2.736) 
3.201 
(2.459) 
3.832 
(2.905) ./Δ    0.611 
(0.472) 
 1.294 
(1.042) 
1.555 
(1.796) 
0.571 
(0.303) +-Δ     -0.455 
(-0.664) 
   
+-Δ     0.125 
(0.492) 
   
+./Δ      0.196 
(0.218) 
  
+./Δ      0.403 
(0.532) 
  
-./Δ       29.072 
(3.438) 
 
-./Δ       11.627 
(1.179) 
 
Intercept 0.343 
(3.013) 
0.341 
(3.373) 
0.298 
(2.678) 
0.376 
(3.110) 
0.341 
(2.806) 
0.376 
(3.285) 
0.379 
(3.003) X#  0.281 0.265 0.286 0.276 0.285 0.303 0.290 
s 0.432 0.437 0.431 0.434 0.431 0.425 0.429 
AIC 1.264 1.286 1.257 1.284 1.272 1.247 1.268 
SIC 1.676 1.697 1.669 1.757 1.744 1.719 1.753 
p[AR(1)] 0.536 0.227 0.278 0.419 0.386 0.233 0.268 
p(F,R
2
=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p(F,FE) 0.196 0.513 0.414 0.211 0.286 0.275 0.259 
p(F,restrict) 0.087 0.015 0.141 0.028 0.085 0.570 0.137 
Number of observations 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Table 9 notes: The dependent variable is the difference of the natural logarithm of loans, dlloans. Coefficients for the regressors are reported with 
t-ratios based upon White’s heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors given in parentheses. X# denotes the adjusted coefficient of 
determination, s is the regression standard error, AIC gives Akaike’s information criterion and SIC denotes Schwart’s information criterion. 
Probability values for the following tests are also reported. A t-test for the coefficient on a first-order autoregressive term when added to the 
model, p[AR(1)], an F-test testing the joint significance of the slope coefficients, p(F,R
2
=0), an F-test for the joint significance of the cross-sectional 
fixed-effects, p(F,FE). Probability values are also reported for a joint test of the exclusion restrictions required to obtain the specific model from the 
general specification reported in Table 13, p(restrict). All results were produced using EViews 6.0. 
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Table 10: Tests of the addition of efficiency variables to the models reported in Table 9 
 
Model → 
Variables added ↓ 
Size Liq Cap Size, Liq Size, Cap Liq, Cap Size, Liq, Cap 
Cost measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.389  0.576  0.622  0.293  0.345  0.387  0.266 
p[VΔ]  0.243  0.411  0.584  0.169  0.297  0.777  0.397 
p[VΔ]  0.603  0.983  0.773  0.853  0.891  0.913  0.978 
p[VΔ+]  0.026  0.507  0.073  0.042  0.142  0.033  0.174 
p[VΔ+]  0.964  0.282  0.681 0.862  0.598  0.410  0.563 
p[VΔ-]  0.144  0.946  0.625  0.665  0.822  0.832  0.671 
p[VΔ-]  0.379  0.803  0.260  0.698  0.232 0.708  0.705 
p[VΔ./]  0.193  0.071  0.009  0.259  0.016  0.111  0.023 
p[VΔ./]  0.714  0.617  0.012  0.570  0.001  0.013  0.011 
Profit measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.410  0.529  0.562  0.407  0.429 0.439  0.433 
p[VΔ]  0.532  0.459  0.538  0.693  0.865  0.586  0.983 
p[VΔ]  0.239  0.316  0.124  0.307  0.115  0.459  0.131 
p[VΔ+]  0.094  0.937  0.389  0.064  0.149  0.320  0.158 
p[VΔ+]  0.806  0.284  0.714  0.807  0.893  0.435  0.931 
p[VΔ-]  0.797  0.000  0.703 0.000  0.420 0.053  0.004 
p[VΔ-]  0.183  0.506  0.164  0.632  0.144  0.373  0.785 
p[VΔ./]  0.213  0.111  0.738  0.251  0.964  0.340  0.943 
p[VΔ./]  0.518  0.394  0.085  0.430  0.118 0.288  0.140 
Table 10 notes: This table reports the probability values for individual t-tests for the addition of lagged efficiency variables, based 
on cost and profit measures both non-interacted and interacted with various combinations of the change in interest rates and 
bank-specific characteristics to the models estimated in Table 9. The results are obtained using the fixed-effects estimator with 
White heteroscedasticty corrected coefficient standard errors implemented in EViews 6. Bold emphasis indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 11: Pooled OLS estimates of (1), excluding efficiency variables 
Model → 
Variable ↓ 
size liq cap size, liq size, cap liq, cap size, liq, cap 
Δ  -1.876 
(-5.176) 
-1.924 
(-5.885) 
-1.762 
(-5.037) 
-1.909 
(-6.005) 
-1.782 
(-5.485) 
-1.885 
(-5.361) 
-1.893 
(-5.579) Δ  -0.627 
(-3.863) 
-0.596 
(-4.485) 
-0.615 
(-3.845) 
-0.591 
(-5.091) 
-0.598 
(-3.561) 
-0.602 
(-4.217) 
-0.579 
(-4.251)    -1.420 
(-1.213) 
-1.665 
(-1.521) 
-1.473 
(-1.254) 
-1.641 
(-1.540) 
-1.639 
(-1.474) 
-1.997 
(-1.742) 
-1.803 
(-1.564)   1.272 
(2.688) 
1.576 
(3.419) 
1.039 
(1.931) 
1.473 
(3.159) 
1.046 
(1.962) 
1.411 
(2.797) 
1.346 
(2.750)   1.093 
(2.317) 
1.117 
(2.563) 
1.060 
(2.236) 
1.121 
(2.782) 
1.091 
(2.435) 
1.238 
(2.625) 
1.144 
(2.519)   -1.312 
(-2.747) 
-1.379 
(-3.092) 
-1.235 
(-2.608) 
-1.380 
(-3.267) 
-1.273 
(-2.835) 
-1.475 
(-3.076) 
-1.376 
(-2.970) +  -0.020 
(-1.138) 
  -0.017 
(-0.964) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
 0.008 
(0.422) +Δ  0.003 
(0.044) 
  0.010 
(0.111) 
0.074 
(0.980) 
 0.083 
(1.016) +Δ  -0.025 
(-0.486) 
  -0.064 
(-1.261) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 -0.033 
(-0.432) -   0.094 
(0.626) 
 0.023 
(0.182) 
 0.233 
(1.524) 
0.199 
(1.358) -Δ   -0.619 
(-1.618) 
 -0.949 
(-1.695) 
 0.189 
(0.446) 
0.192 
(0.385) -Δ   -0.777 
(-1.592) 
 -0.877 
(-1.633) 
 -0.374 
(-0.735) 
-0.697 
(-1.204) ./    1.207 
(2.367) 
 1.270 
(2.320) 
1.335 
(2.802) 
1.356 
(2.498) ./Δ    2.755 
(1.822) 
 3.766 
(3.068) 
2.854 
(2.431) 
4.141 
(2.895) ./Δ    0.862 
(0.745) 
 1.510 
(1.672) 
1.822 
(2.471) 
0.838 
(0.510) +-Δ     -0.438 
(-0.740) 
   
+-Δ     0.188 
(0.786) 
   
+./Δ      0.141 
(0.170) 
  
+./Δ      0.396 
(0.463) 
  
-./Δ       25.727 
(5.154) 
 
-./Δ       7.061 
(0.881) 
 
Intercept 0.338 
(3.438) 
0.366 
(3.776) 
0.341 
(3.226) 
0.368 
(3.767) 
0.357 
(3.333) 
0.396 
(3.790) 
0.384 
(3.654) X#  0.266 0.267 0.283 0.262 0.276 0.293 0.279 
s 0.437 0.436 0.431 0.438 0.434 0.428 0.433 
AIC 1.212 1.211 1.188 1.233 1.214 1.189 1.213 
SIC 1.333 1.332 1.309 1.415 1.396 1.371 1.407 
p[AR(1)] 0.822 0.714 0.744 0.771 0.755 0.777 0.659 
p(F,R
2
=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p(F,restrict) 0.093 0.102 0.456 0.033 0.196 0.908 0.270 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Table 11 notes: The dependent variable is the difference of the natural logarithm of loans, dlloans. Coefficients for the regressors are reported 
with t-ratios based upon White’s corrected standard errors given in parentheses. X# denotes the adjusted coefficient of determination, s is the 
regression standard error, AIC gives Akaike’s information criterion and SIC denotes Schwart’s information criterion. Probability values for the 
following tests are also reported. A t-test for the coefficient on a first-order autoregressive term when added to the model, p[AR(1)], an F-test 
testing the joint significance of the slope coefficients, p(F,R
2
=0) and a joint test of the exclusion restrictions required to obtain the specific 
model from the general specification reported in Table 13, p(restrict). All results were produced using EViews 6.0. 
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Table 12: Tests of the addition of efficiency variables to the models reported in Table 11 
 
Model → 
Variables added ↓ 
Size Liq Cap Size, Liq Size, Cap Liq, Cap Size, Liq, Cap 
Cost measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.119  0.388  0.271  0.141  0.174  0.316  0.168 
p[VΔ]  0.394  0.380  0.448  0.271  0.250  0.660  0.387 
p[VΔ]  0.854  0.806  0.957  0.947  0.845  0.603  0.686 
p[VΔ+]  0.018  0.475  0.115  0.068  0.047  0.156  0.093 
p[VΔ+]  0.939  0.246  0.568  0.821  0.467  0.346  0.459 
p[VΔ-]  0.217  0.804  0.902 0.828  0.465  0.728  0.801 
p[VΔ-]  0.177  0.998  0.161  0.996  0.093  0.959  0.965 
p[VΔ./]  0.135  0.152  0.000 0.186  0.003  0.073  0.011 
p[VΔ./]  0.526  0.833  0.001  0.375  0.000  0.003  0.007 
Profit measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.600  0.716  0.986  0.657  0.975  0.967  0.999 
p[VΔ]  0.337  0.382  0.527 0.487 0.842  0.563  0.977 
p[VΔ]  0.118  0.233  0.126  0.199  0.117  0.395  0.143 
p[VΔ+]  0.039  0.941  0.488  0.017  0.093  0.534  0.090 
p[VΔ+]  0.884  0.241  0.586  0.854  0.695  0.365  0.633 
p[VΔ-]  0.828  0.001  0.548  0.003  0.277  0.052  0.015 
p[VΔ-]  0.089  0.256  0.100  0.377  0.075  0.203  0.589 
p[VΔ./]  0.105  0.079  0.517 0.135  0.614  0.149  0.549 
p[VΔ./]  0.317  0.444  0.058  0.240  0.053 0.261  0.131 
Table 12 notes: This table reports the probability values for individual t-tests for the addition of lagged efficiency 
variables, based on cost and profit measures both non-interacted and interacted with various combinations of the change in 
interest rates and bank-specific characteristics to the models estimated in Table 11. The results are obtained using the pooled 
OLS estimators with White heteroscedasticty corrected coefficient standard errors implemented in EViews 6. Bold emphasis 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 13: Pooled OLS and Fixed-effects estimates for general-to-specific modelling, excluding 
efficiency 
Estimation method → Fixed-effects Pooled OLS 
Model → 
Variable ↓ 
General Specific(FE) Specific(OLS) General Specific(FE) Specific(OLS) 
Δ  -1.921 
(-4.337) 
-0.863 
(-9.597) 
-0.972 
(-10.495) 
-1.923 
(-5.292) 
-0.896 
(-9.555) 
-1.025 
(-11.010) Δ  -0.540 
(-2.834) 
-0.401 
(-7.025) 
-0.315 
(-3.938) 
-0.550 
(-3.379) 
-0.420 
(-7.260) 
-0.312 
(-4.200)    -1.975 
(-1.417) 
  -2.106 
(-1.716) 
  
  1.436 
(2.596) 
 1.370 
(1.792) 
1.424 
(2.562) 
 1.673 
(2.092)   1.332 
(2.324) 
  1.264 
(2.542) 
  
  -1.575 
(-2.683) 
  -1.503 
(-2.901) 
  
+  -0.081 
(-1.219) 
  0.006 
(0.311) 
  
+Δ  0.098 
(1.421) 
  0.093 
(1.172) 
  
+Δ  -0.001 
(-0.010) 
  -0.015 
(-0.286) 
  
-  0.452 
(1.688) 
  0.274 
(1.631) 
  
-Δ  0.794 
(1.071) 
  0.711 
(0.961) 
  
-Δ  -0.101 
(-0.145) 
  -0.256 
(-0.379) 
  
./  1.676 
(2.585) 
1.862 
(3.249) 
1.678 
(2.863) 
1.471 
(2.703) 
1.437 
(3.503) 
1.285 
(2.933) ./Δ  4.461 
(1.728) 
  4.415 
(1.898) 
  
./Δ  2.083 
(1.115) 
  2.279 
(1.323) 
  
+-Δ  0.113 
(0.176) 
  0.086 
(0.132) 
  
+-Δ  0.440 
(1.536) 
  0.343 
(1.168) 
  
+./Δ  0.082 
(0.054) 
  -0.029 
(-0.021) 
  
+./Δ  0.493 
(0.489) 
  0.324 
(0.296) 
  
-./Δ  30.475 
(3.995) 
23.671 
(4.639) 
23.105 
(4.504) 
26.195 
(4.074) 
21.857 
(6.062) 
21.080 
(5.840) -./Δ  22.120 
(2.417) 
  14.106 
(1.721) 
  
Intercept 0.404 
(2.991) 
0.221 
(6.642) 
0.154 
(3.651) 
0.403 
(3.393) 
0.217 
(6.471) 
0.135 
(2.967) X#  0.299 0.291 0.294 0.283 0.282 0.288 
s 0.426 0.429 0.428 0.431 0.432 0.430 
AIC 1.270 1.235 1.233 1.225 1.174 1.169 
SIC 1.827 1.586 1.597 1.492 1.234 1.241 
p[AR(1)] 0.065 0.392 0.374 0.622 0.890 0.859 
p(F,R
2
=0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p(F,FE) 0.176 0.288 0.337 NA NA NA 
p(F,restrict) NA 0.260 0.194 NA 0.440 0.615 
N 308 308 308 308 308 308 
Table 13 notes: see notes to Table 9. 
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Table 14: Tests of the addition of efficiency variables to the models reported in Table 13 
 
Model → 
Variables added ↓ 
General 
[FE] 
Specific(FE) 
[FE] 
Specific(OLS) 
[FE] 
General 
[OLS] 
Specific(FE) 
[OLS] 
Specific(OLS) 
[OLS] 
Cost measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.207  0.915  0.749  0.233  0.164  0.237 
p[VΔ]  0.500  0.533  0.503  0.607  0.455  0.410 
p[VΔ]  0.853  0.953  0.958  0.518  0.592  0.618 
p[VΔ+]  0.890  0.534  0.545  0.780  0.536  0.552 
p[VΔ+]  0.306  0.643  0.631  0.181  0.388  0.399 
p[VΔ-]  0.501  0.624  0.495  0.808  0.882  0.699 
p[VΔ-]  0.818  0.543  0.447  0.685  0.535  0.379 
p[VΔ./]  0.670  0.116  0.115  0.503  0.082  0.077 
p[VΔ./]  0.115  0.771  0.678  0.028  0.611  0.510 
Profit measure of efficiency 
p[V]  0.439  0.891  0.873  0.962  0.423  0.609 
p[VΔ]  0.993  0.359  0.516  0.992  0.386  0.611 
p[VΔ]  0.298  0.391  0.310  0.267  0.399  0.295 
p[VΔ+]  0.136  0.963  0.960  0.069  0.945  0.934 
p[VΔ+]  0.412  0.637  0.610  0.749  0.359  0.367 
p[VΔ-]  0.231  0.986  0.795  0.244  0.832  0.920 
p[VΔ-]  0.380  0.422  0.336  0.395  0.421  0.281 
p[VΔ./]  0.506  0.123  0.129  0.201  0.069  0.074 
p[VΔ./]  0.509  0.978  0.897  0.420  0.868  0.782 
Table 14 notes: This table reports the probability values for individual t-tests for the addition of lagged efficiency 
variables, based on cost and profit measures both non-interacted and interacted with various combinations of the change in 
interest rates and bank-specific characteristics to the models estimated in Table 13. The results are obtained using the OLS and 
fixed-effects estimators (the estimation method is indicated in squared brackets in the model headings) with White 
heteroscedasticty corrected coefficient standard errors implemented in EViews 6. Bold emphasis indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 15: Long-run estimates of specific models obtained using GMM, Fixed-effects and pooled OLS  
Estimation method → 
Variable ↓ 
GMM FE OLS 
Δ   -1.265 
(-9.161) 
-1.337 
(-11.282)   4.360 
(2.388) 
 1.673 
(2.092) S  -0.913 
(-1.498) 
  
./   1.862 
(3.249) 
1.285 
(2.933) Liq × Δ  -12.785 
(-2.279) 
  
Liq × CAP × Δ   23.671 
(4.639) 
21.080 
(5.840) 
 Intercept 0.207 
(0.482) 
0.221 
(6.642) 
0.135 
(2.967) 
Table 15 notes: The static equilibrium coefficients derived from the favoured specific models estimated by GMM, fixed-effects (specific FE) and 
pooled OLS (specific OLS) reported in Table 6 and Table 13 are given in the columns headed GMM, FE and OLS, respectively. Equilibrium t-ratios 
are reported in parentheses where the coefficient standard error for the GMM model is calculated using the approximation based upon a 
Taylor series expansion (see De Boef and Keele, 2008).  
 
 
 
Table 16: Tests for selectivity bias 
 GMM Fixed-effects Pooled OLS   0.746 Collinearity 0.174 #  0.609 Collinearity 0.087   Collinearity Collinearity Collinearity 
Joint 0.851 Collinearity 0.075 
Table 16 notes: probability values for the null of no selection bias in the dynamic parsimonious specifications whose long-run solutions are 
reported in Table 15. For , # and  these are based on t-tests whereas Joint denotes a test for the joint exclusion of all included dummy 
variables. An entry of Collinearity indicates that this variable was dropped from the regression due to multicollineaity. 
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Figure 1: Evolution through time of the cost measure of Turkish bank efficiency 
 
 
Figure 1 notes: The vertical axis denotes the cost measure of bank efficiency for each bank (EFF_C_*) 
where * is the bank identifier (the key is specified in Table 3 in parentheses after the name of each bank) 
and the year is given on the horizontal axis (1991 – 2007).  
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Figure 2: Evolution through time of the profit measure of Turkish bank efficiency 
 
 
Figure 2 notes: The vertical axis denotes the profit measure of bank efficiency for each bank (EFF_P_*) 
where * is the bank identifier (the key is specified in Table 3 in parentheses after the name of each bank) 
and the year is given on the horizontal axis (1991 – 2007).  
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